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FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND 
INTEREST RATE DETERMINATION 
THE CASE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1981-1985* 
Ma Socorro H Gochoco** 
I INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the need to liberalize financial 
markets in developing countries There are empirical studies 
whicn indicate a direct relationship between economic performance 
and the deyree to whicn the financial sector is developed, 
including the degree to wnicn interest rates are market-
determined McKinnon's study (1986, pp 320-321) posits that a 
high M2/GNP ratio and its rapid growth induces a large real flow 
of loanable funds tnrough the organized financial sector which is 
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positively correlated with real GDP growth. He cites as examples 
the cases of West Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. There 
is, however, a dearth of literature on the subject of how 
interest rates are determined once the financial sector has been 
liberalized. Experiences of countries which have liberalized 
their financial sector - such as the southern cone countries of 
Latin America, namely, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay - show that 
domestic interest rates increased to very high levels following 
the commencement of financial liberalization programs. Empirical 
evidence also suggests that external factors, including high and 
volatile world interest rates, have been transmitted to 
developing countries. It is clear that there is a need to 
examine how both domestic and external factors affect interest 
rates in developing countries which have liberalized their 
financial sectors. 
The degree of openness of the capital account plays an im-
portant role in the process of determining interest rates. If 
capital flows were totally unrestricted, world interest rates, 
the expected rate of change of the exchange rate, and risk 
factors would determine domestic interest rate via the interest 
parity relationship. 
If the capital account were completely closed, domestic 
interest rates would be determined by the domestic real interest 
rate, monetary conditions and the expected rate of inflation via 
the Fisher effect. Having a fully-open or fully-closed capital 
account is an extreme assumption to make. It is assumed that 
developing countries fall somewhere in between these two. 
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In this study, an attempt is made to explain how interest 
rates are determined by both domestic monetary conditions and 
external factors once the financial sector is liberalized. The 
empirical model utilized incorporates these domestic and external 
factors. Monthly, end-of-period data from January 1981 to Decem-
ber 1985 are used. A generalized least squares procedure is used 
to estimate the model. 
The study is divided into the following sections. Section 
II contains a summary of the literature on the role of interest 
rate in economic development, tne effects of financial repres-
sion, ana the rationale behind financial liberalization programs. 
Section III briefly narrates the interest rate regimes in the 
Philippines. Section IV discusses the empirical model, explain-
ing the behavior of monetary policy and exchange rate movements. 
Section V presents the empirical results. Finally, Section VI 
contains the summary and conclusions of the study. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The importance of interest rates in developing countries 
varies depending on factors such as the degree of monetization of 
the economy, the degree of separation of the savings and invest-
ment decisions, the degree of market-orientedness of the economy, 
etc. 
In developing countries which have.not undertaken financial 
liberalization, interest rates are administratively-determined, 
usually through limits on lending rates and deposit rates set 
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below market equilibrium levels. Various alleged rationaliza-
tions are given for the need to impose these limits including, 
the prevention of an oligopolistic banking system and the need to 
offset distortions in certain sectors of the economy. 
If borrowers have unsatisfied credit demands due to the 
below equilibrium ceilings on interest rates, they may be induced 
to borrow from the curb market at significantly higher interest 
rates. Institutionally/ this practice is not conducive to the 
development of a formal, organized financial sector. It also 
undermines the effectiveness of the interest rate controls. 
Non-price rationing, via selective credit controls and the 
like, may also induce borrowers with unsatisfied credit needs to 
borrow abroad. Savers, on the other hand, are induced to lend 
abroad^ It then becomes trivial to see why capital controls also 
necessarily accompany repressed interest rates. At the same 
time, however, the evasion of these capital controls tends to be 
inversely related to the degree to which domestic interest rates 
deviate from foreign interest rates. 
Another result of holding nominal interest rates below mar-
ket equilibrium is that if the inflation rate is high and vari-
able, real rates of interest become negative. Negative real in-
terest rates have been allowed to prevail for such reasons as to 
reduce the cost of servicing the public sector's debt and to en-
courage investment and subsidize disadvantaged sectors. 
In developing countries with underdeveloped capital markets, 
although the savings ratio may be high, most saving is in the 
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form of physical or real assets rather than financial saving. 
McKinnon (1986, pp. 323-325) points out that if the rate of 
inflation is high, the private sector is forced to postpone 
current consumption. Instead, the private sector attempts to 
build-up its holdings of nominal money balances to compensate for 
the loss of purchasing power due to the inflation. This in-
flation tax accrues to the government as the sole issuer of money 
and is classified in the GNP accounts as if it were saving. How-
ever, real personal financial assets are not accumulating and the 
flow of loanable funds to the private sector is small. Negative 
real deposit rates mean that real assets earn a higher return 
than savings accounts and hence, people purchase inflation hedges 
such as real estate, real goods, etc. This reduces the amount of 
financial savings and could raise the rate of inflation if people 
hedge by buying domestic goods. If people hedge by purchasing 
foreign assets and foreign goods, foreign exchange reserves are 
depleted and the domestic exchange rate will tend to depreciate. 
Similarly, if real loan rates are negative, it is profitable to 
borrow even when the borrowed funds are channelled to endeavors 
with very low rates of return. 
It is not clear, however, how an increase in nominal inter-
est rates, via financial liberalization, to positive levels in 
real terms to negate the effects of financial repression, affects 
the economy. People may be encouraged to save more. This is 
basically the thesis of McKinnon (1973, p. 15, 67) and Shaw 
(1973, p. 73, 237). In the short-run, people may be encouraged 
to purchase domestic interest-bearing financial assets, 
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increasing the supply of bank credit available for investment. 
Kapur (1976) takes the argument one step further and posits that 
the increased amount of funds available for investment will raise 
output and hence reduce inflation. An opposing view regarding 
the effect of the real interest rate on savings is given by 
Giovannini (1983). This study of several countries including the 
Philippines indicates that the elasticity of savings with respect 
to the real rate of interest is insignificant or significantly 
negative. 
The arguments of McKinnon et al. have recently been 
challenged in the literature. The Sacay, Agabin, and Tanchoco 
(1985, p. 102, 124) study shows that income is the major deter-
minant of saving. The interest rate may have a greater effect on 
the form of savings, either financial or real, than on its level. 
An Asian Development Bank (ADB) study (1985, p. 48) also shows 
that the interest rate effect on financial saving is considerably 
greater than the national saving interest rate effect. 
Even if higher interest rates were to lead to a higher 
savings rate a la McKinnon, the growth rate may decline. Buffie 
(1982) and Van Wijnbergen (1983) have shown that the conclusions 
of McKinnon et al. depend on the assumption that when financial 
liberalization takes place, people shift into domestic financial 
assets whose interest rates have risen by shifting out of 'unpro-
ductive assets,' such as currency and foreign bonds which do in-
crease the supply of loanable funds. At the same time, there is 
also a link between the supply side of the economy and the credit 
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via the financing of working capital If people shift out of 
curbmarket loans instead of these 'unproductive' assets, the 
aggregate loan supply contracts and the rates on curbmarket loans 
will rise If there is a significant curb market and curb loans 
are good substitutes with domestic financial assets, there will 
be a contractionary effect on the aggregate supply of credit and, 
hence, the supply of output This will tend to accelerate in-
flation A recent study by Lim (1985) shows this to be the case 
for the Philippines Van Wijnbergen's thesis is that asset mar-
ket structures are important in the transmission of monetary 
policy, a thesis first put forth by Tobin in 1975 In order to 
determine the effect of rising interest rates on savings, it is 
important to determine tne degree of substitutability between the 
domestic financial assets versus 'unproductive' assets or curb-
market loans 
To summarize, few would probably argue that interest rates 
are unimportant in a developing economy, especially in an economy 
in which working capital costs are financed with credit The 
policy to liberalize the financial sector and free interest rates 
from admi nistratlve controls is presumably intended to remove the 
inefficiencies arising from non-^rice rationing such as selective 
credit controls, negative real interest rates, and intermediation 
through informal markets, by allowing the pricing process to give 
the correct market signals Tnere is less agreement, however, on 
the effects of the freeing of interest rates on the rate of 
savings as well as on output growth and inflation The success 
of financial liberalization programs depends on a number of 
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important parameters, on fiscal control, such as the absence of 
budget deficits which are financed by money creation, and a non-
inflationary environment. 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY 
The period from 1956-1973 is recognized as the period of low 
1 / 
and rigid interest rates . Ceilings on loan rates were pre-
scribed by the Usury Act of 1916. In 1956, ceilings were imposed 
on deposits. This was probably a deliberate policy move to 
protect thrift and rural banks from competition from commercial 
banks, the former viewed as institutions which provide medium and 
long-term loans. However, the interest differentials on deposits 
offered by commercial banks versus those offered by thrift and 
rural banks was so small. Moreover, the interest rate differ-
ential between savings and time deposits was also small. Hence, 
funds were neither attracted to institutions which provide medium 
and long-term loans nor to long-term financial assets. Special-
ized banks to meet the mostly medium and long-term needs of 
certain sectors were created by the Central Bank. Due to Central 
Bank regulations outlining the special banks, the financial sys-
tem became fragmented. 
Evidence on the flow of loanable funds shows that M2/GNP 
declined continuously in the early '70s. This indicates that as 
~ V 
For a more detailed discussion, see Lamberte, Mario B. 
"Financial Liberalization and the Internal Structure of Capital 
Markets: The Philippine Case," PIDS Staff Paper Series No. 85-07 
(April 1985). 
inflation increased, real rates declined and people hedged by 
switching their portfolios in favor of real assets. In addition, 
after 1965, the pace of economic activity increased, as did the 
demand for credit. With loan rates still prescribed by the Usury 
Act and ceilings on deposit rate below market equilibrium, the 
gap between the supply and demand for loanable funds widened. 
Selective credit controls to allocate the available credit and 
meet the needs of certain sectors were imposed. Simultaneously, 
however, these controls lost their selectivity as the Central 
Bank liberalized its rediscounting policy. The wide spread bet-
ween rediscounting rates and prescribed loan rates encouraged 
banks to borrow from the Central Bank to meet the excess demand 
for loanable funds and undermine the selective credit controls. 
Also, since only short-term papers were eligible for rediscount-
ing, there was seemingly a bias against long-term lending. In 
any case, banks tended to act as allocators of Central Bank funds 
rather than as mobilizers of savings. 
The equity market remained underdeveloped also because it 
was cheaper for firms to borrow from banks than to raise equity 
by selling stocks. 
The dtsvBAupnieiit ut new financial "non-bank" institutions, 
whose financial investments were unregulated and aimed at cir-
cumventing the ceilings on interest rates served as an impetus 
for the development of the money market. Reforms were introduced 
in 1972 to cope with the increasing sophistication of the finan-
cial system. These reforms, however, seem to have exacerbated 
the specialization among financial institutions. Starting in 
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1973, the Monetary Board was given the authority to set maximum 
lending rates, rendering obsolete the Usury Act of 1916. 
The period from 1974-1980 is the transition period marking 
the commencement of financial liberalization. Interest rates 
were still fixed but were adjusted constantly by the Monetary 
Board to reflect market conditions. The policies were aimed at 
reducing and stabilizing "money market rates and providing a base 
for the development of a long-term market' (IMP/WB Report 1979). 
In general, the results indicate that the flow of loanable funds 
increased as seen in the rising M3/GNP ratio over the period. 
These policy changes are discussed below. 
In 1974, ceilings on short-term deposits were raised while 
the rate on the long-term time deposits was deregulated in order 
to attract long-term funds. 
To be able to compete with the growing share of deposit 
substitutes, interest ceilings on savings and time deposits were 
increased in 1976. Simultaneously, for deposit substitutes, an 
interest ceiling was imposed, minimum placement requirements were 
raised and a reserve requirement ratio of 20 percent was imposed. 
This was aimed at encouraging the flow of funds towards long-
term assets. 
In 1977, the interest rate ceilings on loans were made syno-
nymous with effective interest rate ceilings in order to reduce 
the effective cost of funds to borrowers. 
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In 1979, the interest rate ceiling on various financial ins-
truments increased by two percentage points to compensate lenders 
and savers from the inflation attributed to the second oil crisis 
and to prevent outflows as interest rates abroad increased. 
In 1980, rates on loans of four years or more were 
deregulated. 
Institutionally, the minimum paid-in capital requirements of 
banks were increased, encouraging the merger and consolidation of 
banks. Equity participation of foreign entities in domestic 
banks likewise increased. The expansion of Foreign Currency 
Deposit Units (FCDUs) and Offshore Banking Units (OBUs) allowed 
greater access to the foreign currency market. It did, however, 
also encourage firms to depend on debt financing rather than 
equity financing as rates abroad were lower at least prior to 
1979, and also because the Central Bank provided forward cover to 
minimize exchange rate risk and/or default risk. 
1981 marks the beginning of the floating interest period. 
Interest rate ceilings on all types of deposits and loans except 
short-term were lifted. Ceilings on short-term loans, however, 
were only lifted in 1983. 
The financial system was restructured to increase the compe-
titive conditions in the financial system. There was a reduction 
in the differentiation among categories of banks and non-banks 
authorized to perform quasi-banking (NBQBs). Universal banks 
offeri ng sl wide range of financial services were promoted* Bank 
minimum -capital requirements were increased. There is some evi-
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dence presented in Lamberte and Remolona's (1986) study that the 
financial reforms put a squeeze on bank profits. 
In 1981, the Central Bank started phasing out its CBCIs in 
order to make way for treasury bills. 
The M3/GNP ratio rose consistently when interest rates on 
time and savings deposits were substantially positive. However, 
the fully flexible interest rate regime failed to increase the 
flow of loanable funds because of the haphazard rediscounting 
policy of the Central Bank and the Central Bank's use of money 
creation to finance budget deficits. 
The medium and long-term rediscounting facility allowed 
banks to rediscount papers for the acquisition of assets, working 
capital, and investment in affiliates and high grade securities. 
To encourage the transformation of short-term loans to medium and 
long-term loans, the Central Bank allowed any paper, regardless 
of maturity, to be accepted as security. Instead of attempting 
to increase the supply of loanable funds by mobilizing savings, 
banks seem to have simply borrowed from the Central Bank. Hence/ 
while the term structure of bank portfolios was lengthened, the 
volume of financing provided was insufficient for the country's 
needs. Liberal rediscounting also discouraged the development of 
the equity market by encouraging debt borrowing. 
A liquidity and BOP crisis in 1984 accelerated new financial 
liberalization efforts in the form of floating interest rates. 
Rates on time deposits increased from 14 percent per annum in 
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1980 to 15.6 percent per annum in 1981. In 1984, it rose to 32.5 
percent due to a 50 perce'nt rate of inflation, yet the M3/GNP 
ratio declined. This is evidence that a highly inflationary 
environment is detrimental to the mobilization of financial 
savings as people switch from nominal assets to real assets and/ 
or from domestic currency to foreign currency. 
IV. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Edwards and Khan (1985) is the only paper that the author is 
aware of which has a model of interest rate determination for an 
economy which has just undergone financial liberalization. 
In the case of a fully-closed economy, i.e., one in which no 
capital flows are permitted, the interest rate is determined via 
the Fisher relationship: 
e 
i = rr + II (1) 
t t t 
where i = nominal rate of interest at time t 
t 
rr = real rate of interest at time t 
t 
e 
II = expected rate of inflation at time t 
t 
Furthermore, the real rate of interest is composed of a 
natural rate or that which is unaffected by nominal variables, 
and a cyclical component. The cyclical component may be viewed 
as the deviations from the natural rate induced by an excess 
supply of money. Attempts by portfolio holders to get rid of 
this excess supply of money gives rise to the so-called liquidity 
effect. 
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The liquidity effect pertains to the decline in interest 
rates as portfolio holders get rid of the excess money supply by 
purchasing financial assets and goods. The prices of financial 
assets rise and nominal interest rates decline. This initial de-
cline in interest rates is subsequently reversed by income and 
price expectations effects. The Fisher Effect states that nomi-
nal interest rates will adjust upwards as expected inflation 
rises, in order to keep the real rate of interest constant. * We 
ignore the so-called Darby-Feldstein effect of taxes on the nomi-
nal interest rate which could raise nominal interest rates beyond 
that implied by the Fisher effect. 
The implicit assumptions that expected inflation does not 
affect the real rate of interest via the so-called' Mundell-Tobin 
effect and that the excess supply of money does not affect the 
expected rate of inflation are made. 
In their model, the excess supply of money is measured as 
the difference between actual and desired money balances. 
Edwards and Khan allow for the partial adjustment of desired to 
actual money balances. Desired money balances depends on income, 
the nominal interest rate, and expected inflation. Given a 
measure of expected inflation, equation (1) can be estimated for 
a closed economy. 
A fully-open economy is one which there are no barriers to 
capital controls such as administrative controls, large trans-
actions costs or imperfect asset substitutability due to differ-
ing risk characteristics between foreign and domestic financial 
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assets In this case, the domestic interest rate is determined 
via the uncovered interest parity relationship 
1 = 1 * + e (2) 
t t t 
where 
l = domestic nominal rate of interest 
t 
i * = foreign nominal rate of interest 
t 
e = expected rate of depreciation of the 
t 
domestic currency 
In other words, the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency depends on the interest rate differential between domes-
tic and foreign assets As long as there is a measure of the 
expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, equation 
(2) can be estimated for an open economy Edwards and Khan also 
assume a sluggish adjustment of domestic to foreign interest 
rates 
In general, the capital account is never fully-closed or 
fully-open, so it is improper to simply estimate either equation 
(1) or (2) Even in the case of a country with legal barriers to 
capital flows, it is not obvious that capital is perfectly immo-
bile 
For these reasons, Edwards and Khan estimate a linear com-
bination of equationb (1) and (2) in which the weight used is tne 
degree of financial openness of the capital account 
e 
i = ip (l * + e ) + (1 - (rr +n ) (3) 
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where ty measures the degree of financial openness of the 
capital account. If ^ = 1 , the capital account is fully-open, 
and (3) reduces to (2). Conversely, if = 0, the capital 
account is fully closed, and (3) reduces to (1). In general, we 
would expect to lie between zero and one. 
This study takes this general approach used by Edwards and 
Khan. It varies from their approach in two ways: 
(a) It is assumed that it is unanticipated monetary growth that 
leads to the so-called liquidity effect rather than the excess 
supply of money. Unanticipated monetary growth is defined as the 
difference between actual and expected monetary growth as in 
Barro (1977). In other words, when actual monetary growth 
exceeds that which had been expected, portfolios are disturbed. 
People rid their portfolios of this by purchasing financial 
assets and goods. Again, prices of financial assets rise and 
interest rates decline temporarily. Similarly, expected infla-
tion is measured as the differerice between anticipated monetary 
growth and the growth of output. Note that in our model, it is 
assumed that the liquidity effect and the Fisher effect occur 
concurrently whereas in past studies, the liquidity effect occurs 
first and is only reversed by income and price expectation 
effects subsequently. Here, we allow the liquidity effect and 
the Fisher effect to occur concurrently as it is assumed that 
they are due to different components of monetary growth. 
(b) A generalized least-squares estimation procedure is used. 
The equations for expected monetary growth, expected exchange 
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rate depreciation, and the interest rate are estimated jointly 
with constraints imposed across equations. 
MG = Z y + e (4) 
t t-1 t 
where MG is monetary growth at time t. 
t 
Z is a vector of variables available at time 
t-1 
t - 1 when the forecast is made 
y is a vector of coefficients 
e is an error term which is assumed to be serially 
t 
uncorrelated. 
The optimal linear forecast of MG namely E(MG /I ) or AMG 
t t t-1 t 
where I is the information set available on which the fore-
t-1 
casts is conditioned from (4) 
AMG = Z Y (5) 
t t-1 
where AMG = anticipated monetary growth 
t 
By definition, therefore, unanticipated monetary growth, UMG, is 
simply the difference between (4) and (5), i.e., 
UMG = MG - AMG (6) 
t t t 
• \ 
Suppose that the real rate consists of a natural rate and a 
cyclical component affected by unanticipated monetary growth. 
rr = R - L UMG + w (7) 
t o t t 
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where rr = real rate of interest at time t 
t 
R = natural rate 
L = coefficient which measures the 'pure' liquidity 
o 
effect 
w = error term 
t 
Assume that 
e 
n » AMG - Y (8) 
t t t 
e 
where n = expected rate of inflation at time t 
t 
Y = growth of real output at time t 
t 
e 
Following the Fisher relation, i = rr +n 
t t t 
In this case, therefore, 
i = R - L UMG + E (AMG -Y ) + E (9) 
t o t o t t t 
where E = the coefficient which measure the 'pure' effect 
o 
of expected inflation on the interest rate, and 
e = an error term, 
t 
If the capital account were fully-closed, (9) would describe the 
manner in which the interest rate is determined. 
In the case of an open economy, following the uncovered 
interest parity relationship, it is necessary to specify an 
equation which describes how expectations of exchange rate 
changes are formulated. 
e = X 6 + n (10) 
t t-1 t 
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a vector of variables used to explain exchange 
rate changes at time t available at time t-1 
when the forecast is made, 
a vector of coefficients 
an error term which is assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated, 
If we assume, as Edwards and Khan do, that domestic interest 
rates adjust to foreign interest rates with a lag, then 
i = 0 (i * + e ) + ( 1 - 0 ) i (11) 
t t t t-1 
Substituting for e in (11), 
t 
i = 9 (i * + X 6) + (1 - 6) i + V (12) 
t t t-1 t-1 t 
where V is an error term, 
t 
If the capital account were fully-open, (12) would describe the 
manner in which the interest rate is determined. 
If the economy is neither fully-closed nor fully-open, 
interest rates will be determined by both domestic monetary 
conditions and open economy factors. The degree to which either 
or both of these factors matter depends on the degree of finan-
cial openness. Combining equations (9) and (12), assuming slow 
adjustment of domestic interest rates to foreign interest rates, 
following (3) we obtain: 
i = (i * + x 6) + if) (1 - 0) i (13) 
t t t-1 t-1 
+ (1 - ip ) [R - L (MG - Z Y) ] 
o t t-1 
+ (1 - ) E (Z y - Y ) + e 
o t-1 t t 
where X 
t-1 
6 
n 
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In (13)/ the assumption is made that there is a constant 
risk premium. If, however, the risk premium varies with time, or 
if 'the controls on capital are liberalized smoothly over time, 
1(1 should be modelled as a function of a time trend. 
T|> = K + K * TREND 
O 1 
Alternatively, if capital controls are loosened and 
tightened sporadically over time, a dummy variable could be con-
structed such that the dummy variable is equal to 1 when controls 
are loosened or equal to 0 when controls are tightened. ^ would 
then be modelled in the following way: 
ty = K + K * DUMMY 
O 1 
In the estimation procedure used, (5), (10), and (13) are 
estimated jointly, where the 6 in (10) and (13) and the y in (5) 
2/ 
and (13) are constrained to be equal across equations. This 
V 
Tests of the validity of these constraints could be con-
ducted by estimating (2), (7), and (10) without the said 
constraints. The test statistic is constructed in the following 
manner: 
- Zn log [SSRL - SSR*] 
where n is the number of observations 
SSRl is the sum of squared residuals of the constrained 
system 
SSR A is the sum of squared residuals of the uncons-
trained system 
2 
The test statistic is distributed as a X (q) where q is the 
number of constraints. 
The validity of the constraints not only indicates whether 
market participants form their expectations consistently with the 
known economic structure but also indicates the appropriateness 
of the model specified. A rejection of the constraints, there-
fore, could be due to the failure of one or both of these. 
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assumes that people form their expectations consistently with the 
known economic structure. 
Equations (5), (10), and (13) are estimated jointly using a 
generalized least squares procedure. The computer package is SAS 
and the seemingly unrelated regression procedure in the ETS 
library is used. The error term in (13) is modelled using a 
first order autoregressive process to correct for serial correla-
tion, i.e., e = pe + n . 
t t-1 t 
1. Monetary Policy in the Philippines 
In Porzecanski's (1979) study of monetary policy in Latin 
America two (2) different patterns of money supply growth are 
* 
postulated. The Central Bank may have as its chief goal the 
maintenance of currency and price stability. Given such a mone-
tary policy, the Central Bank will vary money creation directly 
with the lagged growth of foreign exchange reserves. The Central 
Bank's reaction to the lagged rate of growth o-f, output is not 
clear, a priori. The monetary authorities may restrict the rate 
of growth of domestic credit to dampen import demand if they 
interpret tne increase in real GNP growth as temporary. On the 
other hand, if the increase in GNP growth is viewed as permanent, 
the monetary authorities could expand credit in order to meet the 
increased demand for money. 
Alternatively, the Central Bank may have goals other than 
the maintenance of currency and price stability. The pursuit of 
these other goals could lead to inflationary effects and exchange 
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rate depreciations. For example, the Central Bank could be used 
to finance chronic budget deficits, keep the rate of unemployment 
from declining, or maintain a certain level of real liquidity. 
Hence, under this pattern of monetary policy, lagged changes in 
the price level and the rate of growth of real GNP will be posi-
tively related while the rate of unemployment will be negatively 
related to the rate of growth of domestic credit. 
In Appendix A, the results of the regressions of the rate of 
growth of base money on uniform lags of different explanatory 
variables are presented. While most of the lagged values of the 
explanatory variables are not jointly statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level using an F-test, their signs, neverthe-
less, give some idea about the behavior of the monetary authori-
ties. In all cases, base money creation is negatively related to 
the lagged rate of international reserves. Base money creation 
is positively related to real output growth and to lagged rates 
of inflation perhaps because deficits are financed via money 
creation. The signs on logs of the employment rate are mixed. 
The positive relationship of base money creation to lagged rates 
of growth of output is also compatible with accommodation of the 
increased demand for credit from an increase in real output 
viewed as permanent by the monetary authorities. These findings 
indicate that the authorities have goals other than the mainte-
nance of currency and price stability. On the other hand, it is 
not clear how the negative signs on lagged log (CPI/WPI) should 
be interpreted. If CPI is assumed to be the price of non-traded 
goods and WPI the price of traded good , the negative signs on 
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the lags of log (CPI/WPI) mean that the authorities are also 
concerned about price stability 
The results of the F-test at the 5 percent level for joint 
significance of the lags of the explanatory variables indicate 
that the appropriate forecasting equation has four lags each of 
the growth of international reserves, and the rate of inflation 
(using tne CP! index) However, the Durbin-Watson statistic was 
quite low and hence, aside from the growth rate of international 
reserves and rate of inflation, four lags of base money growth 
are included in the money forecasting equation This is success-
ful in ensuring that the error term is serially uncorrelated 
2 Modelling Exchange Rate Movements 
The Philippine peso was allowed to float in the Foreign 
Exchange market on February 21, 1970 Pante's (1983) study 
tested alternative hypotheses regarding the behavior of the 
Central Bank (CB) with exchange rate 
1) The CB acts to stabilize the effective exchange rate 
2) A Purchasing Power Parity rule in which inflation 
differentials between the domestic economy and its ma^or 
trading partners are compensated by exchange rate 
ad]ustments 
3) Targetting the stock changes in the level of inter-
national reserves 
4) Linking exchange rate changes to changes in the current 
account 
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Using the change in either the nominal or effective exchange 
rate as the dependent variable, and explanatory variables 
ascribed to hypotheses 1 through 4, Pante's results for the 
period 1973-1981 support the hypothesis that the CB, on average, 
adjusts the nominal exchange rate in response to changes in the 
current account balance. The relationship is significant up to a 
lag of two quarters. 
Lamberte (1984) uses a vector autoregressive system of the 
nominal exchange rate, current account balance, money stock, and 
the ratio of the domestic to foreign price level. One of his 
findings is that the current account balance is endogenous with 
respect to the exchange rate. 
This study uses the log of the black market premium, 
calculated as the ratio of the Hongkong bank note rate divided by 
i 
the official exchange rate times 100, as the dependent variable. 
Uniform lags of four, six, or eight of the explanatory variables 
were used. The explanatory variables include lags of the black 
market premium, the current account balance, the growth rate of 
international reserves, the log of the CPI/WPI index which is 
similar to Lamberte's relative price index if it is assumed that 
the CPI index measures the price of non-traded goods and the WPI 
index measures the price of traded goods, the differential bet-
ween the domestic 91-day interest rate and the 3-month U.S. 
Treasury Bill rate which could proxy for inflation differentials 
as in Pante's study, assuming that financial markets are 
efficient. 
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Using monthly data, the results shown in Appendix B indicate 
that in all except one case, only lags of the log of the black 
market premium are jointly significant at the 5 percent level 
using an F-test. In only one regression were lags of the log of 
international reserves jointly significant. According to these 
results, therefore, the black market premium is highly autore-
gressive. The current rate depends on the previous rate. 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Using the estimation procedure outlined in section IV, the 
empirical results can be classified into three groups. 
1. A partial adjustment model of actual to desired money 
balances where desired money balances depend on income, the 
interest rate and expected inflation, is used in an attempt 
to simply replicate the model used in Edwards and Khan 
(1985). The reduced form for the interest rate equation 
is: 
TB91 = C0 + CI*(i + e ) + C2* Y + C3* M 
t t t t t-1 
e 
+ C4* II + C5* TB91 
t t-1 
where i * = 90-day U.S. Treasury Bill rate 
# t 
e = expected rate of change of the exchange 
t 
rate 
Y = rate of growth of output' 
t 
M = lagged rate of growth of base money 
t-1 
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e 
n a expected rate of inflation. It is 
t 
measured as the difference between 
anticipated monetary growth and output 
growth, AMG - Y . Note that AMG is 
t t t 
based on information available at t-1. 
TB91 = the 91-day Treasury Bill rate 
C = coefficients 
s 
Table I shows the results of two regressions 
using a partial adjustment model of actual to desired money 
balances. 
Equation 1.1 uses a forecasting equation for monetary 
growth with four lags of itself, the growth of inter-
national reserves, and the rate of inflation using the CPI 
index. The coefficients of output growth, expected infla-
tion and the lagged interest rate are positive and statis-
2 
tiscally significant based on their t-values. The R s, 
except for the money forecasting equation, indicate good 
fits. The calculated PHI coefficient is 0.85. 
In order to see whether the results are sensitive to 
the forecasting equation used, an alternative forecasting 
equation for expected inflation is used. The same fore-
casting equation for the exchange rate is used. In 
equation 1.2, the forecasting equation for the inflation 
rate using the CPI index consists of six lags of itself. 
When this alternative forecasting equation is used, 
only expected inflation and the lagged interest rate are 
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2 
significant The R s indicate good fits, including that 
for the expected inflation equation The calculated PHI 
coefficient is above unity which is not expected, a priori 
The results are sensitive to the specification of the 
forecasting equation Only expected inflation and the 
lagged interest rate are significant in both equations 
2 The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated 
monetary growth is used It is assumed that unanticipated 
monetary growth gives rise to the liquidity effect Anti-
cipated monetary growth less the rate of growth of output 
captures the effect of expected inflation on the nominal 
interest rate and gives rise to tne Fisher effect No 
partial adjustment model of actual to desired or expected 
money holdings is assumed The reduced form for the inte-
rest rate equation is 
TB91 = C0 + CI * (l * + e ) + C2 * TB91 
t t t t-1 
+ C3 * (M - AMG ) + C4 * (AMG - Y ) 
t t t t 
where 
M - AMG = unanticipated monetary growth at 
t t 
time t 
C0 = (1-PHI) * R 
CI = PHI * THETA 
C2 = PHI * (1 - THETA) 
C3 = (1 - PHI) * LO 
C4 - (1 - PHI) * EO 
PHI measures the degree of financial openness. 
The closer PHI is to unity, the greater the 
degree of financial openness. 
THETA measures the speed of adjustment of 
domestic to foreign interest rates. 
LO measures the size of the "pure" liqu-idity 
effect. 
EO measures the size of the "pure" Fisher 
effect 
R the natural component of the real rate 
which is unaffected by nominal variables 
such as inflation. 
Table II presents the results of several regressions 
using different forecasting equations for monetary growth 
or inflation in which the distinction between anticipated 
and unanticipated monetary growth is made. Among these are 
an autoregressive specification with six lags of the rate 
of inflation using the CPI index, and a variation of the 
inflation forecasting equation in Mariano (1984). 
In the six regressions, the lagged interest rate is 
significantly positive as in the previous case. However, 
the coefficient on anticipated monetary growth less the 
growth of output is not significant in any case. In four 
out of six cases, it has the correct positive sign. The 
coefficient on unanticipated monetary growth is only signi-
ficantly negative in one case [Equation II.4]. Again, in 
four out of six cases, it has the correct negative sign. 
There is not much variation in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients on the interest parity relationship and the 
lagged interest rate. There is, however, large variations 
in the magnitudes of the coefficients on anticipated mone-
tary growth less output growth and unanticipated monetary 
growth. 
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The R s are comparable and indicate good fits except 
that for- the monetary growth or inflation forecasting 
equation whose values range from 9 percent to 68 percent. 
It is possible to calculate PHI and THETA from the 
estimated Cs. In all cases, PHI is significant but above 
unity, contrary to what is theoretically expected. The 
values for PHI range from 1.09 to 1.22. THETA, the speed 
of adjustment of domestic to foreign interest rates, is 
never statistically significant and its magnitudes are 
quite small. They range in value from 0.15 to 0.23. The 
estimated natural component of the real rate, R, ranges in 
value from 7.65 to 12.16. 
This is a modification of the results in group II. The 
degree of financial openness parameter, PHI, is modelled as 
depending on a time trend if it is assumed that there is a 
time varying risk premium or if capital controls were 
loosened gradually over time. An alternative formulation 
is to assume that capital controls were tightened or 
loosened sporadically over time. In this case, a dummy 
variable is used in place of a time trend variable in 
modelling PHI. The interest rate equation is the 
following: 
TB91 = (1 - Kl - K2 * X) * R 
+ (Kl + K2 * X) * THETA * (i * + e ) 
t t 
+ (1 - Kl - K2 * X) * EO * (AMG - Y ) 
t t 
+ (1 - Kl - K2 * X) * LO * (M - AMG ) 
t t 
where X = TREND or DUMMY 
Kl/ K2 = coefficients 
The dummy variable is equal to unity when capital 
controls are relatively loose and equal to zero during 
periods of relatively tight capital controls. In our case, 
the dummy variable is equal to one from January 1981 to 
October 1983 and from November 1984 to May 1986. It is 
equal to zero from November 1983 to October 1984 [See 
Lamberte et al. (1985)]. 
Again, in order to test the robustness of the results 
with respect to the forecasting equations used, other fore-
casting equations for monetary growth or inflation are 
used. 
Table III shows the results when PHI is modelled as a 
function of a time trend or of a dunsny variable. 
When a dunrniy variable is used (Equations III.l and 
III.2), THETA has plausible values ranging from 0.35 to 
0.38 which are significant. The calculated average PHI 
values range from 0.85 to 0.91. The natural component of 
the real rate, R, ranges from 22.30 to 22.58. The signifi-
cance of K2, the coefficient of the dummy variable, depends 
on the forecasting equation used. It is significantly 
negative in equation Iii.l where tne forecasting equation 
for monetary growth consists of four lags itself, the 
inflation rate, and the growth of international reserves. 
A priori, we would expect the coefficient on the dummy 
variable to be significantly positive. In other words, if 
capital controls are relatively loose, PHI is closer to 
unity and vice-versa. One way of interpreting the finding 
of a significantly negative coefficient on the dummy is the 
following: As legal capital controls become relatively 
loose, this is viewed as a signal that there is less 
incentive to evade the controls and so capital is less 
likely to flee the country. The converse also holds. The 
calculated coefficients on anticipated and unanticipated 
monetary growtn varies greatly, again depending on the 
forecasting equation specified. 
When a time trend variable is used instead of a dummy 
variable (Equations III.3 and III.4), the results are poor. 
THETA is close to zero or worse, negative. This indicates 
that using a time trend variable is not the proper way to 
model PHI. 
In equations III.5 and III.6, a term allowing for a 
lagged liquidity effect is included. It is not significant 
in either equation. The calculated average PHI values 
range from 0.87 to 0.92. THETA ranges in value from 0.36 
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to 0.45. R ranges in value from 22.06 to 23.35. Again, 
the coefficient on the dummy variable is negative but sig-
nificant only in equation III.5. In equation III.5, the 
calculated coefficient on anticipated and unanticipated 
monetary growth yield more plausible values when the fore-
casting equation for monetary growth has four lags of 
itself, the inflation rate, and the growth rate of inter-
national reserves. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A model which explains the determination of nominal interest 
rates in an economy which has just undergone financial liberal-
ization has been developed. 
The measure of the degree of financial openness, PHI, 
depends on the forecasting equation for monetary growth or 
expected inflation used, and whether or not an allowance is made 
for sporadic changes in the level and intensity of capital con-
trols. The values of PHI range from 0.85 to above unity, the 
latter being inconsistent with the theoretical specification. 
Hence, if we look only at the results with theoretically-
plausible values for PHI, those in Table III, this means that an 
increase in the foreign interest rate of 10 percent translates 
into an increase in domestic interest rate of 8.5 percentage 
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1/ points on an annualized basis. The speed of adjustment of 
domestic to foreign interest rates, as measured by THETA, ranges 
in value from 0.36 to 0.45. This means that the average or mean-
time lag in the adjustment of the nominal interest rate to a 
change in either the foreign interest rate or the exchange rate 
would be between one and two quarters. 
While the model yields theoretically-plausible values of 
PHI and THETA, the question is whether these values are real-
istic. If there are legal capital controls in effect, a value of 
0.85 for PHI seems to indicate that these capital controls are 
ineffective. Is this result realistic? If it is, why is it so, 
given that there are legal barriers to capital. How can the 
legal controls be effectively enforced? It might be pointed out 
that in Edwards and Khan's study of Colombia, supposedly a closed 
economy as there are legal restrictions and capital mobility, the 
PHI value obtained was 0.84 while the THETA value obtained was 
0.42, both of which are similar to those obtained in this study. 
This means that countries such as the Philippines and Colombia 
are more integrated with the rest of the world than expected, 
despite the existence of legal barriers to capital mobility. It 
means that domestic monetary policy has little direct effect on 
the interest rate although it may have an indirect influence via 
the forward premium. 
3/ Note, however, that for different interest rates, one 
could have different values of PHI. Also, even if the capital 
account were completely closed, open economy factors could still 
affect the domestic interest rate indirectly. For example, a 
shock in the terms of trade could reduce real income and the 
demand for credit, and hence, the domestic interest rate. 
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If domestic and international markets are linked via capital 
flows, the efforts of trade liberalization reforms directed at a 
more realistic (higher) real exchange rate could be frustrated by 
capital inflows. The real exchange rate will appreciate and this 
will hamper export expansion. The point is that the success of 
financial liberalization programs impinge on and are impinged on 
by reforms in other areas. 
One possible modification of the model is the recognition 
that exchange rate expectations probably depend on the domestic 
interest rate and domestic monetary policy. Also, a better way 
to quantify the effects of legal capital controls could be devel-
oped. Another possible extension of the study is to analyze the 
behavior of real rates of interest. Among the questions that 
might be addressed are the following: 
1) What is the effect of financial liberalization on real 
interest rates and how is aggregate demand affected? 
2) Have real interest rates tended to equalize across countries? 
As Edwards (1985) points out, even if the capital account 
is fully-open and total credit is increased, real interest rates 
could still be high because of: 
a) an increase in the demand for credit 
b) a continuous increase in expectations of devaluation 
c) the existence of transactions costs that pose obstacles to 
arbitrage 
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d) an increase in the country-risk premium due to such factors 
as the rapid growth of foreign debt. 
Some research could also be devoted to determining interest 
rates given varying degrees of financial openness. 
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Table 1 
NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = C0 + CI* (i * + e ) + C2*Y + C3* M 
t t t t t-1 
e 
+ C4*II + C5*TB91 + pe + n 
t t-1 t-1 t 
Equation 1.1 
Forecasting Equations 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Growth Rate of Base Money = (4 lags of itself, 4 lags of 
the growth rate of inter-
national reserves, 4 lags of 
the inflation rate using the 
CPI index) 
C0 = -1.05 
CI = -0.074 
C2 = 86.612** 
C3 = 6.533 
C4 » 79.935* 
C5 = 0.9259** 
p = -0.09 
(-0.44) 
(0.63) 
(2.07) 
(0.44) 
(1.92) 
(24.49) 
(-0.54) 
Calculated Coefficients 
PHI » 0.8519 
SSE DFE MSE R 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 0.1903 52 0.003 0.72 
Growth Rate of Base Money 0.2368 48 0.004 0.11 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 160.091 39 4.104 0.96 
Note: In this and in succeeding tables, SSE is the sum of 
squared errors, DFE is the number of degrees of freedom, 
and MSE is the mean squared error. The t-statistics are 
in parentheses. 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = C0 + CI* (i + | ) + C2* Y + C3* M 
t t t t-1 e 
+ C4* n + C5* TB91 + pe + n 
t t-1 t-1 t 
Equation 1.2 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Inflation Rate = f(6 lags of itself) 
C0 = -2.888 (-0.66) 
CI = 0.273 ( 0.264) 
C2 = 1.019 ( 0.23) 
C3 = -5.191 (-1.12) 
C4 = 55.636* ( 1.63) 
C5 = 0.9156** (12.13) 
P = 0.419** ( 2.45) 
Calculated Coefficients 
PHI = 1.18 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 
Inflation Rate 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 
SSE DFE MSE R 
0.190 30 0.003 0.72 0.0097 49 0.001 0.51 237.955 40 5.94 0.94 
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Table 2 
NON-LINEAtt ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = C0 + Cl* (I * + e ) + C2* TB91 + C3* 
t t t t-1 
(M - AMG ) + C4* (AMG - Y ) + pe + n 
t t t t t-1 t 
Equation 2.1 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Growth Rate of Base Money = f(4 lags of itself, 4 lags of 
the inflation rate, 4 lags of 
the growth rate of inter-
national reserves). 
C0 = -1.38 (-0.27) 
Cl = -0.214 ( 0.75) 
C2 » 0.9199 ( 9.26)** 
C3 = -1.238 (-0.23) 
C4 = 1.317 ( 0.30) 
p = 0.50 ( 2.67)** 
Calculated Coefficients 
PHI = 1.13** 
THETA = 0.15 
R = 9.86 
L.09 .ul tue oxackmarket Premium 
Growth Rate of Base Money 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 
SSE DFE MSE R 
0.190 52 0.003 0.72 
0.177 48 0.003 0.33 
259.6 40 6.49 0.94 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = C0 + CI*(i * + e ) + C2*TB91 + C3* (M -AMG ) 
t t t t-1 t t 
+ C4*(AMG - Y ) + pe + n 
t t t-1 t 
Equation 2.2 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Growth Rate of Base Money = f(4 lags of itself, 4 lags of 
output growth, 4 lags of inter-
national reserves, 4 lags of 
CPI/WPI index). 
C0 = -1.46 (-0.28) 
CI = 0.221 ( 0. 75) 
C2 = 0.919 ( 8. 88)** 
C3 = -2.69 (-0. 51) 
C4 = 1.633 ( 0. 38) 
P = 0.50 ( 2. 59)** 
Calculated Coefficients 
PHI = 1.14** 
THETA = 0.19 
R = 10.42 
2 
SSE DFE MSE R 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 0 .190 52 0.003 0 .72 Growth Rate of Base Money 0 .196 46 0. 004 0 .26 91-day Treasury Bill Rate 257 .75 38 6.78 0 .94 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = C0 + Cl*(i * + e ) + C2*TB91 + C3*(M - AMG ) 
t t t t-1 t t 
+ C4 * (AMG - Y ) + pe + n 
t t t-1 t 
Equation 2.3 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself/ 4 lags 
of current account) 
Growth Rate of Base Money = f(4 lags of the growth rate of 
international reserves, 4 lags 
of the inflation rate). 
C0 « -0.75 (-0.14) 
CI = 0.195 ( 0.63) 
C2 = 0.903 ( 8.16)** 
C3 = -1.02 (-0.19) 
C4 = 0.730 ( 0.16) 
P = 0. 50 ( 2.44)** 
Calculated Coefficients 
PHI = 1.09** 
THETA = 0 . 1 7 
R = 7.65 
2 
SSE DFE MSE R 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 0.122 47 0.002 0.821 
Growth Rate of Base Money 0.183 49 0.003 0.31 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 261.14 37 7.057 0.94 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = C0 + Cl*(i + e ) + C2*TB91 + C3*(M - AMG ) 
t t t t-1 t t 
C4* (AMG - Y ) + pe + n 
t t t-1 t 
Equation 2.4 
Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate = f(6 lags of itself, 6 
lags of the log of in-
ternational reserves) 
Growth Rate of Base Money = f(4 lags of the growth rate of 
international reserves, 4 lags 
of the inflation rate). 
C0 = -1.489 (-0.54) 
CI = -0.182 ( 0.94) 
C2 = 0.975 (21.36)** 
C3 = -7.55 (-3.56)** 
C4 = 5.08 ( 1.46) 
P = 0.115 ( 0.64) 
Calculated Coefficients 
PHI = 1.157** 
THETA = 0 . 1 5 
R = 9.48 
2 
SSE DFE MSE R 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 0.083 46 0.001 0.98 
Growth Rate of Base Money 1.44 48 0.030 0.09 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 191.03 36 5.30 0.95 
Note: Only OLS estimates 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = C0 + Cl*(i * + e ) + C2*TB91 + C3*(M - AMG ) 
t t t t-1 t t 
+ C4* (AMG - Y ) + pe ' + n 
t t t-1 t 
Equation 2.5 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Inflation Rate = f(6 lags of itself) 
C0 = -2.677 (-0.53) 
Cl — +0.286 ( 0.97) 
C2 = 0.936 (10.11)** 
C3 = 2.165 ( 0.48) 
C4 = -2.00 (-0.45) 
p = 0.48 (2.67)** 
Calculated Coefficients 
PHI = 1.22** 
THETA = 0.23 
R = 12.16** 
2 
SSE DFE MSE R 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 0.190 50 0.003 0.72 
Growth Rate of Base Money 0.009 . 49 0.0001 0.52 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 257.58 41 6.28 0.94 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = C0 + Cl*(i * + e ) + C2*TB91 + C3*(M - AMG ) 
t t t t-1 t t 
+ C4 * (AMG - Y ) + pe + n 
t t t-1 t 
Equation 2.6 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Inflation Rate = f(2 lags of itself, log of the blackmarket 
premium lagged once, lagged rate of growth 
of WPI, lagged growth rate of base money/ 
growth rate of output, lag of the log of 
employment, lagged interest rate) 
C0 = = -1.16 (-0.25) 
CI = = +0.192 ( 0.75) 
C2 = = 0.922 ( 9.35)** 
C3 = = 2.27 ( 0.51) 
C4 = » -1.05 (-0.26) 
P > = 0.51 ( 2.84) 
Calculated Coefficients 
PHI = = 1.114** 
THETA = • 0.17 
R = = 10.17 
SSE DFE MSE R 
Inflation Rate 0.006 52 0.001 0. 688 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 0.191 53 0.030 0. 723 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 260.37 43 6.055 0. 944 
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Table 3 
NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = (1 - PHI) * R + PHI * THETA * (i * + e ) 
t + (1 - PHI)*EO*(AMG - Y ) + (1 - PHI) 
t t 
* L0 * UMG + Pe + n 
t t-1 t 
Equation 3.1 where PHI = Kl + K2 * DUMMY 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Growth Rate of Base Money » f(4 lags of itself, 4 lags of 
inflation rate, 4 lags of the 
growth rate of international 
reserves). 
r = 22.58** ( 4.12) 
THETA = 0.38** ( 2.59) 
p = 0.92** (12.09) 
Kl = 1.22** ( 7.67) 
K2 = -0.37* (-1.74) 
Calculated Coefficients 
Average PHI =0.91 
Coefficient on anticipated monetary growth less the growth 
rate of output = 3.25 
Coefficient on anticipated monetary growth = 3 . 8 6 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 
Growth Rate of Base Money 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 
SSE DFE MSE R 
0.19 52 0.003 0.72 
0.18 48 0.003 0.30 
227.18 39 5.84 0.95 
46 
NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = (1 - PHI) * R + PHI * THETA * (i + e ) 
t t t 
+ (1 - PHI) * E0 * (AMG - Y ) + (1 - PHI) 
t t 
* L0 * UMG + pe + n 
t t-1 t 
Equation 3.2 where PHI = Kl + K2 * DUMMY 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Growth Rate of Base Money = f(2 lags of the inflation rate, 
log of the blackmarket premium 
lagged once, lagged rate of 
growth of WPI, lagged growth 
rate of base money/growth rate 
of output, lag of the log of 
employment, lagged interest 
rate). 
R = 22.30** ( 2.64) 
THETA = 0.35** ( 2.20) 
p = 0.91** (10.66) 
Kl = 1.02** (11.67) 
K2 = -0.20* (-1.16) 
Calculated Coefficients 
Average PHI =0.85 
Coefficient on anticipated monetary growth: less the growth 
rate of output = 1.65 
Coefficient on unanticipated monetary growth = 48. 77 
SSE DFE MSE R 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 0.19 53 0.003 0.72 
Inflation Rate 0.006 52 0.001 0.68 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 242.9 42- 5.78 0.94 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = (1 - PHI) * R + PHI * THETA * (i * + e ) 
t t t 
+ (I - PHI) * EO * (AMG - Y ) + (1 - PHI) 
t t 
* LO. * UMG + pe + n 
t t-1 . t 
Equation 3.3 where PHI = Kl + K2 * TREND 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium - t(4 lags of itself) 
Growth Rate of Base Money = f(4 lags of itself, 4 lags of 
the inflation rate, 4 lags of 
the growth of international 
reserves). 
R = 22.77** { 1.71) 
THETA = 0.02 (0.10) 
p = 0.46** ( 1.97) 
Kl = 1.11** ( 9.14) 
K2 = -0.005 (-0.93) 
Calculated Coefficients 
Average PHI = 0.91 
Coefficient on anticipated monetary growth less the growth 
rate of output = 4.52 
Coefficient on unanticipated monetary growth = 10.53 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 
Growth Rate of Base Money 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 
SSE 
0.19 
0.19 
196.0 
DFE MSE R 
52 0.003 0.72 
48 0.004 0.26 
39 5.04 0.95 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = (1 _ PHI) * R + P H I * THETA * (i + | > 
+ (1 - PHI) * E * (AMG - Y ) +t(l -tpHI) 
o t t 
+ LO * UMG + pe + n 
t t-1 t 
Equation 3.4 where PHI = Kl + K2 * TREND 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
inflation Rate = f(2 lags of itself, log of the blackmarket 
premium lagged once, lagged rate of growth 
of WPI, lagged growth rate of base money/ 
growth rate of output, lag of the log of 
employment, lagged interest rate). 
R = 19.90** ( 3.55) 
THETA = -0.07 (-0.38) 
p = 0.89** (10.06) 
Kl = 1.99** ( 2 . 1 2 ) 
K2 = -0.03* (-1.86) 
Calculated Coefficients 
Average PHI =0.96 
Coefficient on anticipated monetary growth less the growth rate of output = 0 . 1 0 growtn 
Coefficient on unanticipated monetary growth = 3.67 
2 SSE DFE MSE F 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 
Inflation Rate 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 
MSE R 
0.19 53 0.003 0. 72 0. 006 52 0.0001 0.68 231.29 42 5.50 0.95 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 t 
= (1 - PHI) * R + PHI * THETA * (i * + e ) t t 
+ (1 - PHI) * EO * (AMG - Y ) + (1 - PHI) t t 
* LI * UMG + pe + n 
t-1 t-1 t 
Equation 3.5 where PHI = Kl + K2 * DUMMY 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Growth Rate of Base Money = f(4 lags of itself, 4 lags of 
the inflation rate, 4 lags of 
ie growth rate of international 
(serves) . 
R = 23.35** (5.16) 
THETA = 0.45** ( 3.00) 
p = 0.95** (15.14) 
Kl = 1.41** ( 4.65) 
K2 = -0.60* (-1.69) 
Calculated Coefficients 
Average PHI = 0.92 
Coefficient on anticipated monetary growth less the growth 
rate of output = 1 . 6 6 
Coefficient on unanticipated monetary growth = 3.8 
Coefficient on lagged Unanticipated Monetary Growth = 2.54 
2 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 
Inflation Rate 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 
SSE OFE MSE R 
0.19 51 0.003 0.72 
0.18 47 0.003 0.30 
224.20 37 6.06- 0.95 
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NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION 
MODEL: TB91 = (1 - PHI) * R + PHI * THETA * (i * + e ) 
t t t 
+ (1 - PHI) * EO * (AMG - Y ) + (1 - PHI) 
t t 
* LO * UMG + (1 - PHI) * LI * UMG + 
t t-1 
pe + n 
t-1 t 
Equation 3.6 where PHI = Kl + K2 * DUMMY 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium = f(4 lags of itself) 
Inflation Rate = f(2 lags of itself, log of the blackmarket 
premium lagged once, lagged rate of growth 
of WPI, lagged growth rate of base money/ 
growth rate of output, lag of the log of 
employment, lagged interest rate). 
R = 22.06** ( 2.47) 
THETA = 0.36** ( 2.28) 
p = 0.91** (10.64) 
Kl = 1.03** (10.88) 
K2 = -0.19 (-1.05) 
Calculated Coefficients 
Average PHI = 0.87 
Coefficient on anticipated monetary growth less the growth 
rate of output = 1.59 
Coefficient on unanticipated monetary growth = 44.0 
Coefficient on lagged Unanticipated Monetary Growth = 1.72 
2 
SSE 
Log of the Blackmarket Premium 0.19 
Inflation Rate 0.006 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 240.51 
DFE MSE R 
53 0.003 0.72 
52 0.0001 0. 68 
41 5.86 0.94 
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APPENDIX A 
REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING THE GROWTH RATE OF RESERVE MONEY 
Equation Explanatory Variables No of Sign 
No Lags 
(1) growth rate of international 4 
reserves 
(2) growth rate of reserve money 4 
(3) inflation rate using CPI 4 + 
Note Only (3) was significant 
(1) growth rate of reserve money 4 
(2) inflation rate using CPI 4 + 
(3) log of the nominal exchange 
rate 4 
Note Only (2) was significant 
(1) growth rate of reserve money 4 
(2) growth rate of international 
reserves 4 
(3) log of the nominal exchange 
rate 4 mixed 
(4) log of CPI/WPI index 4 
(5) inflation rate using CPI 4 + 
(1) growth rate of reserve money 4 
(2) growth rate of international 
reserves 4 
(3) log of the exchange rate 4 mixed 
(4) inflation rate using CPI 4 + 
Note (4) was significant 
(2) and (4) were jointly 
significant 
(1) growth rate of reserve money 4 
(2) growth rate of index of 
production 4 + 
(3) growth rate of international 
reserves 4 
(4) 91-day Treasury Bill rate 4 mixed 
(5) rate of growth of WPI index 2 mixed 
(1) growth rate of reserve money 
(2) growth rate of international 
reserves 
(3) log of the nominal exchange 
rate 
(4) log of CPI/WPI index 
(5) inflation rate using CPI 
(6) growth rate of employment 
(1) growth rate of reserve money 
(2) growth rate of international 
reserves 
(3) inflation rate using CPI 
Note: Only (3) was significant 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
mixed 
mixed 
mixed 
mixed 
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APPENDIX B 
FORECASTING EQUATIONS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG OF THE BLACKMARKET PREMIUM 
Equation Explanatory Variables No. of Sign 
No. Lags 
(1) log of the blackmarket premium 4 mixed 
(2) current account balance 4 mixed 
(3) growth rate of international 
reserves 4 mixed 
(4) log of the CPI/WPI index 4 
(5) (TB91 - USTB90) differential 4 
Note: Only (1) was significant 
(1) log of the blackmarket premium 6 mixed 
(2) current account balance 6 mixed 
(3) growth rate of international 
reserves 6 
(4) log of the CPI/WPI 6 mixed 
(5) (TB91 - USTB90) differential 6 
Note: Only (1) and (2) were 
significant 
3 (1) log of the blackmarket premium 4 + 
(2) current account balance 4 -
(3) growth rate of international 
reserves 4 mixed 
(4) log of the CPI/WPI index 4 mixed 
4 (1) log of the blackmarket premium 8 mixed 
(2) current account balance 8 -
(3) growth rate of international 
reserves 8 -
(4) log of the CPI/WPI index 8 mixed 
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6 + 
6 mixed 
6 + 
6 • + 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG OF THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE 
Equation Explanatory Variables No. of Sign 
No. Lags 
(1) log of the nominal exchange 
rate 
(2) current account balance 
(3) log of the CPI/WPI index 
(4) log of international reserves 
Note: (1) and (4) were significant. 
(1) log of the nominal exchange 
rate 8 
(2) current account balance 8 mixed 
Note: Only (1) was significant. 
(1) log of the nominal exchange 
rate 8 + 
(2) current account balance 8 + 
(3) log of the CPI/WPI index 8 + 
(4) log of international reserves 8 mixed 
Note: Only (1) was significant 
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LIST OF VARIABLES 
Note: All data are for the end of the month. 
Variable 
Name 
Descr iption Units Source 
TB91 
TBUS90 
INTLR 
Ml 
M3 
CACCT 
RMON 
ER 
BMKT 
PRODN 
91-day Treasury Bill Rate 
90-day US Treasury Bill 
Rate 
International Reserves 
of the Central Bank 
Total Domestic Liquidity 
Current Account Balance 
Reserve Money 
Peso Per U.S. Dollar Rate 
Blackmarket Premium on 
the U.S. Dollar 
100*Hongkong Banknote 
Rate/ER 
Value of Production Index 
percent/ 
annum 
percent/ 
annum 
million 
U.S. 
dollars 
million 
pesos 
million 
pesos 
million 
U.S. 
dollars 
million 
pesos 
9/$ 
1985=100 
CPI Consumer Price Index for 
the Philippines 
1972=100 
Central Bank 
Main Economic 
Indicators: 
OECD/OCDE 
Central Bank 
Statistical 
Bulletin 
Central Bank 
Central Bank 
Central Bank 
Central Bank 
Central Bank 
Hongkong Bank-
note Rate -
Far Eastern 
Economic 
Review 
Industry Trends: 
NEDA, Statis-
tical Coordi-
nation Office 
National Census 
and Statistics 
Office 
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EMP 
WPI 
Employment Index 
Wholesale Price Index 
for Imports 
1985=100 Industry Trends: 
NEDA, Statis-
tical Coordi-
nation Office 
National Income 
Accounts 
[monthly values obtained by interpolation of quarterly data] 
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